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Economic Impacts of Not Extending Biofuels Subsidies 
 
 
The exponential growth of the biofuels industry has created significant increases in feed 
prices to the livestock sector. In February and March of 2007, the National Cattlemen’s Beef 
Association and the National Pork Producers called for the non-renewal of the $0.51 per gallon 
excise tax credit for ethanol as well as elimination of the $0.54 per gallon import tariff on ethanol. 
This study uses a stochastic model to analyze the impact of not extending the ethanol tax credit, 
the ethanol import tariff, or the $1.00 per gallon biodiesel tax credit on the biofuels and 
agricultural commodity markets. The Renewable Fuel Standard mandate requiring a minimum of 
ethanol use is maintained. The study finds that future growth in biofuels relies heavily on the 
extension of the tax credits and import tariff. Commodity prices will fall without the extension of 
them and making net farm income drop by an average of $3.1 billion per year over the 2011-2016 
period.  This is because lower feed prices for livestock producers represent low output prices for 
crop farmers. 
 
Introduction 
The exponential growth of the ethanol industry has begun to draw concerns from the 
livestock industry as feed costs jumped nearly 30 percent from October 2006 to February 2007 
(Warner). These concerns prompted both the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (Shinn) in 
February 2007, and the National Pork Producers (Warner) in March 2007 to call for non-renewal 
of the excise tax credit for ethanol and the import tariff on ethanol. Other groups such as the 
American Petroleum Institute have argued that biofuels should compete on their own economics 
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rather than on government subsidies (Cavaney). Biofuels already hold a prominent position in the 
2007 farm bill debate. This analysis seeks to offer two contributions to the literature: 
1) To provide perspective on the degree of biofuels’ dependence on the tax credit 
and tariffs and, 
2) describe the impact of discontinuing the biofuel subsidies and the ethanol import 
tariff on commodity markets, government costs, and farm income. 
 
Literature Review 
The explosion of the biofuels sector has occurred so quickly, and the data so sparse, that 
there are few relevant published journal articles on the subject. There are a number of recent 
working and briefing papers, but the biofuels industry has grown faster than even these papers 
foretold. Two papers of particular relevance to this study were written by researchers at the Center 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.  
In October 2006, CARD researchers Elobeid and Tokgoz evaluated two scenarios against 
the January 2005 baseline of the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI). 
However, the biofuels industry has been growing much faster than the FAPRI January 2005 
baseline anticipated resulting in much higher corn prices than FAPRI’s baseline projected. The 
first scenario considered the impact of removing the US import tariff of $0.54 and the 2.5 percent 
ad valorem tariff on ethanol, but continuing the $0.51 tax credit. The analysis indicated that US 
ethanol prices would fall as cheaper imports from Brazil reduced ethanol prices which would cause 
the blend price of ethanol and unleaded gasoline to fall and US total gasoline consumption to 
increase. In response to lower domestic ethanol prices, US ethanol production declined. The 
second scenario included the removal of both the ethanol tax credit and import tariff. The removal 
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of the tax credit resulted in lower ethanol producer prices and higher prices to fuel blenders who 
buy ethanol, leading to lower ethanol consumption. Interestingly, US ethanol imports from Brazil 
continued to increase though not as dramatically as in the first scenario. 
In another article, Elobeid, Tokgoz, Hayes, Babcock and Hart estimated a long run demand 
for ethanol in order to determine the derived demand for corn as an input into this process. These 
authors assumed the long run demand for E85 is determined by the price at which the consumer 
can buy an equivalent amount of energy in it or conventional gasoline.  
 This study expands on the earlier research by developing a more detailed model of the 
biofuels sector that captures supply and demand relationships in greater detail and improves the 
relationship among fuel prices. Elements such as the federal tax credit provided public support of 
ethanol production.  They are included in most models documented in the literature but most 
published articles relate to biofuels policies in other countries. Duffield and Collins present a 
broader description of US ethanol policies.  
 
The Stochastic Biofuels Model Structure  
The FAPRI stochastic model of the US agricultural sector is a nonspatial, partial 
equilibrium model covering markets for major grains (wheat, corn, rice, sorghum, barley and oats), 
oilseed (soybeans and their derivatives, sunflower seed, canola and peanuts), cotton, sugar, beef, 
pork, poultry and dairy products. The structure of the stochastic model is a simplification of the 
FAPRI deterministic modeling process in that reduced form equations were used to simulate trade 
in the rest of the world normally represented by international country and regional models when 
scenarios touch on policy changes or events taking place outside the US, and aggregating domestic 
supply regions to a single national market. Even with these simplifications, the model still contains 
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over 1,000 equations representing US crop and livestock supply demand, trade and prices as well as 
sector aggregates such as government expenditures on farm programs, net farm income, 
agricultural land values and consumer food price indices (FAPRI 2005). The model has also been 
extensively developed with the addition of equations representing ethanol and biodiesel markets. 
The crops sector is modeled through behavioral equations representing crop acreage, 
domestic feed, food and industrial uses, stock holding and trade. Similarly, the livestock sector is 
modeled through behavioral equations determined by animal numbers, meat and dairy product 
production, consumption, stock holding (where sizeable) and trade. Equations in the biofuels 
module tie into industrial demands for grains and vegetable oils, and behavioral equations 
determining ethanol and biodiesel production, consumption and trade in products and blends with 
other motor fuels. The model solves for the set of prices that balances annual supply and demand 
into balance in all markets. 
Of particular interest to the present study are the equations that determine the supply, 
demand and price of biofuels. Since the biofuels industry is rapidly growing, and very little data is 
available for the period of rapid expansion, many of the equations are synthetically derived by using 
elasticity assumptions and calibration to the recent history. The model structure for ethanol and 
biodiesel is very similar with the major exception that glycerin is the primary byproduct of the 
biodiesel market and consumer demand for biodiesel is estimated as one equation instead of being 
broken into segments, like the ethanol demand. Since the most dominant biofuel in the US in 2007 
is ethanol, the framework of this model is described in detail. Ethanol production is separated into 
ethanol derived from dry mills and that which is derived from wet mills. In the case of traditional 
dry mills, distillers’ grains (wet and dry) are the primary byproduct of value. In the case of wet 
mills, the byproducts include corn oil, corn gluten feed and corn gluten meal. Since most of the 
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expansion of ethanol production is occurring with dry mills, the model description presented will 
focus on this area. Ethanol plant costs and returns are based upon USDA estimates. Dry mill net 
returns per bushel (NRT) are calculated as the wholesale ethanol price (WETHP) multiplied by 
the number of gallons of ethanol per bushel (ETYLD); plus the distillers’ dried grains (DDG) price 
(DDGP) multiplied by the number of pounds of DDG’s per bushel (DGYLD0; minus the corn 
price (CORNP); minus the natural gas cost (NATP); minus the other costs of conversion (OVC) 
(see equation 3).   
Dry mill ethanol production (PROD) in equation 4, is not directly determined, but rather as 
the product of available productive capacity (CAP) in equation 1, and capacity utilization rates 
(CAPUTL) in equation 2. This structure is used because it takes about 18 months to construct an 
ethanol plant and, once the plant is built, its useful life is expected to be at least ten years. Given 
the multi-period nature of investment in biofuels production facilities, CAP is estimated as a 
function of net returns over five periods including the current year. The current year net returns 
are included in the specification with a very low elasticity since the only ability to respond in the 
first year is to accelerate the construction schedule for plants already under construction. The net 
returns elasticity increases as one moves from the current to previous year, and two years prior net 
returns. This reflects the ability to respond more given a longer time period and the average 18 
month construction process. The net returns elasticities are assumed to be smaller for year’s t-3 
and t-4 since the construction process only takes 18 months. The lagged dependent variable 
reflects the long-term nature of the capacity investment stabilizing capacity shifts from year to year 
(i.e. once a plant is built, the capacity is available for its useful life). The capacity in year t-10 is 
included to capture the retirement of older facilities but it plays a small role given the relative 
youth of production facilities. Even though capacity is built, it is possible that it may not be used if 
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the plants cannot cover their variable cost of production. CAPUTL is only a function of current 
period net returns (see equation 2).   
 
CAPt = f( NRTt, NRTt-1, NRTt-2, NRTt-3, NRT t-4, CAP t-1,CAP t-10).   (1) 
CAPUTLt = f( NRTt).         (2) 
NRTt = WETHPt*ETYLDt+DDGPt*DGYLDt/2000- CORNPt – NATPt-OVCt (3) 
PRODt = CAPt × CAPUTLt        (4) 
 
CAPUTL are synthetically specified in a logistic form, bounding utilization rates between 
zero and 100 percent and varying the responsiveness to changes in price, depending on current 
utilization rates. Additional production of ethanol from other grains besides corn and cellulosic 
based ethanol are included in production totals.  
The demand portion of the ethanol model is necessarily more complicated than the supply 
side because it captures both the retail level (consumers) and wholesale level (blenders), and must 
also consider the total retail market for motor fuels. Retail ethanol demand is broken down into 
demand for ethanol as an additive (the 10 percent ethanol market (E10) less the additive market) 
and the 85 percent ethanol market (E85). In the additive market, ethanol behaves in a 
complimentary relationship with regular unleaded gasoline. For example, as regular unleaded 
gasoline prices increase, total motor fuel use declines and so does the demand for ethanol as an 
additive. However, the E10 and E85 markets, ethanol behaves as substitute for regular unleaded 
gasoline with demand for ethanol increasing as regular unleaded gasoline prices increase. In 
addition, as a substitute, ethanol has between 65 and 70 percent of the energy value of regular 
unleaded gasoline and should sell at a discount compared to regular unleaded gasoline. Labeling at 
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the pump for E10 varies considerably across the US. In some state, gas pumps explicitly state that 
ethanol is included. In northeastern states, for example, gas pumps do not label fuel as E10 or 
otherwise identify ethanol content below the 10 percent level so consumers do not have a choice. 
So it is unclear whether consumers will fully be able to distinguish the fuel economy difference 
between the additive level and the E10 level and as such, may not be as responsive to the 
ethanol/regular unleaded gasoline price ratio. The situation is different for E85 pumps, 
predominantly found in the Midwest, because they require labeling so flex-fuel vehicle owners can 
use it. Consumers can easily distinguish the difference between the fuel economy of E85 and 
regular unleaded gasoline and will likely be much more responsive to the ethanol/regular unleaded 
gasoline price ratio.   
In order to determine the size of the ethanol additive market, motor fuel use (MFU) in 
equation 5 is estimated as a function of the unleaded gasoline retail price (UGRP); income (INC); 
and a very small substitution effect from the retail price of ethanol (RETHP). The unleaded 
gasoline retail price (UGRP), is a function of an exogenous petroleum price index (PPIP), which is 
closely related to the price of crude oil. Motor fuel use and the retail unleaded gasoline price then 
impacts the demand for ethanol in various formulations. 
 
MFUt = f( UGRPt, RETHPt, INCt).       (5) 
 
The segment of additive ethanol demand, denoted ETADD reflects the replacement of the 
oxygenate Methyl tertiary-butyl ether, denoted MTBE, in select markets and can be blended at less 
than 10% in motor fuels. Additive demand is a function of the wholesale ethanol price adjusted for 
the blenders’ tax credit of $0.51 cents per gallon, denoted ETTAX; motor fuel use multiplied by 
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the ethanol additive share required to meet oxygenate requirements, denoted ETADSHR; and 
MTBE use. Demand for ethanol as an additive and replacement for MTBE in regions with 
oxygenate mandates results in a relatively inelastic response to wholesale ethanol prices.  
 For the non additive use, demand is broken into retail market potential and market 
penetration for the E10 and E85 markets. Market potential for the two blends differ on the 
quantity of ethanol demand possible with up to 10 percent inclusion for E10 and up to 85 percent 
inclusion for E85. The E10 blend can be used in the vast majority of motor vehicles on the road 
today making the potential market (E10MKT) in equation 7, 10 percent of motor fuel use less the 
ethanol additive share required to meet oxygenate requirements. The penetration of E10 into the 
market (E10PEN) in equation 8, is a function of the ethanol to regular unleaded price ratio. The 
equation includes two different levels of responsiveness with respect to the price ratio. When the 
ratio is larger than 75 percent only the first term in the equation applies. The significance of the 75 
percent is that it reflects the energy value of ethanol relative to regular unleaded gasoline with an 
allowance for ethanol’s higher octane level. So, as the price ratio falls below 75 percent, ethanol is 
becoming more competitive with regular unleaded gasoline and consumer responsiveness should 
increase. Thus, the second term in the equation kinks the E10 demand from a relatively inelastic 
position to a very elastic demand that is highly responsive to price. Total ethanol demand in the 
E10 market (E10D) is then a product of market potential and market penetration (see equation 9).   
The market potential for E85 (E85MKT) in equation 10, differs as its use is limited in the 
short-run to special ‘flex fuel’ vehicles and only sold in some retail outlets. Therefore this market is 
limited by costly investments required of consumers and retailers, but adoption is expected to 
increase over time, denoted as TREND, and may be accelerated or slowed depending upon the 
price ratio of ethanol and regular unleaded gasoline relative to ethanol’s energy value. E85 market 
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penetration (E85PEN) in equation 11, is specified as a function of the same variables as E10 
market penetration, but with different responsiveness and a lower price ratio of 70 percent. The 
lower trigger ratio than in the E10 market is intended to reflect the fact that E85 has to be 
competitive on an energy basis but also captures the relatively smaller impact of the octane 
premium on a per gallon of ethanol basis. For example, by assumption, the premium built into E10 
for octane implies a 0.5 – 1 percent premium for the blend. (5 to 10 percent premium relative to 
the energy value multiplied by a 10 percent inclusion rate). For E-85, and octane premium will be 
much lower on a per-gallon of ethanol basis.  If the blend value of ethanol’s octane is one percent, 
that would imply only about a 1.35 percent premium for E-85 versus regular unleaded above the 
energy value. The acceptance and use of E85 accelerates as the ratio of retail ethanol to unleaded 
gasoline prices falls below 70 percent, but is very unresponsive at ratios above this point. E85 
demand (E85D) in equation 12, is then a product of market potential and market penetration. 
Total US ethanol demand (ETDMD) in equation 13, is then the maximum of the 
aggregated demand across the additive, E10 and E85 markets or the mandated quantities under the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) subtracting off biodiesel use (BIODSL). 
 
ETADDt = f((WETHPt- ETTAXt), MTBE, MFUt*ETADSHR).  (6)  
 
E10MKTt = f(MFUt, ADDAJt).       (7) 
E10PENt = f(RETHPt/UGRPt, max(0,.75- RETHPt/UGRPt)).   (8) 
E10Dt = E10MKTt × E10PENt      (9) 
E85MKTt = f(E85MKTt-1, TRENDt, max(0,.75-RETHPt/UGRPt)).  (10) 
E85PENt = f(RETHPt/UGRPt,max(0,.7- RETHPt/UGRPt)).    (11) 
 10
E85Dt = E85MKTt × E85PENt      (12) 
ETDMDt = max((ETADDt+E10Dt+E85Dt), RFS-BIODSL)   (13) 
 
Ethanol ending stocks (ETSTK) are specified as a function of wholesale ethanol price 
(reflecting speculative demand) and ethanol production (reflecting transaction demand). Net 
imports of ethanol (ETNIMP) are specified as a function of simulated world ethanol prices and 
domestic prices adjusted for the $0.54 import tariff. The wholesale ethanol market closes on the 
standard supply equals demand identity (see equation 14). 
 
ETSTKt-1+ETPRODt + ETNIMPt = ETDMDt + ETSTKt   (14) 
 
Ethanol wholesale and retail prices are linked through an identity which includes the 
blenders’ tax credit of $0.51 a gallon and a wedge taken from the wholesale to retail price spread of 
unleaded gasoline (see equation 15).   
 
RETHPt = WETHPt-ETTAX+UGRPt-UGWPt.     (15)  
  
The structure of the biodiesel model is similar to ethanol, but somewhat streamlined given 
the size of the industry. The smaller scale of biodiesel production leads to some simplifications and 
demand is not segmented into additive and blend markets, but in any case the model explicitly 
accounts for the $1.00 tax credit to biodiesel blenders. Capacity and capacity utilization in the 
biodiesel markets are determined by net returns for biodiesel plants as published by the National 
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Renewable Energy Laboratory (Tyson). The market is driven largely by soybean oil as a feedstock 
but also includes rapeseed oil, and other oils and fats. 
 
Methodology 
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute’s (FAPRI) January 2007 stochastic 
baseline is used as the basis for comparison in this analysis. The baseline forecast provides 
projections for the 2006/07 to 2016/17 period assuming current policies are extended. The baseline 
was initially developed deterministically, that is to say that exogenous variables in each year took 
single, non-varying values. A set of global econometric models maintained by FAPRI at the 
University of Missouri–Columbia, Iowa State University and the University of Arkansas is solved 
over the given exogenous data to produce values for the endogenous variables relating to 
commodity market quantities and prices for each year. Once the global crops and livestock 
projections were completed, government costs and farm income projections were calculated for the 
United States. After completion of the deterministic baseline, the partial stochastic baseline for the 
US crops, livestock, government costs, and farm income was developed. The partial stochastic 
baseline utilized the historically correlated distributions of crop yields and correlated distributions 
of the errors in key demand equations including exports, to construct 500 possible scenarios based 
on the historical variability in these equations. It is only a partially stochastic exercise because the 
variability in the parameter estimates used in the economic models is not varied and the exogenous 
error terms from the minor equations are not replace with random draws from probability 
distributions. However, partially stochastic analysis provides a perspective on the potential 
variability in results which can be compared with historical variability. 
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 The scenario in this study represents the scheduled expiration of the tax credits and the 
import tariff in the current law, which are assumed to continue in the baseline. The ethanol tariff 
and biodiesel tax credit are set to expire in 2008, while the ethanol tax credit is set to expire in 
2010. In the scenario, the export tariff and biodiesel tax credits are removed beginning January 1, 
2009 and the ethanol tax credit is removed on January 1, 2011. The renewable fuels mandate set by 
the Energy Act of 2005 is assumed to remain in place. In partially stochastic simulations, the 
scenario and the baseline are the results of simulations using the same correlated distribution draws 
so that the output data are directly comparable.   
 
Results 
The impact of the loss of biofuel’s tax credits and the import tariff are presented for the 
2011 to 2016 period (table 1). These data reflect the annual means of the 500 stochastic outcomes 
for both the baseline and the scenario. Therefore the values presented in the table are average of 
3,000 numbers (6 year period with x 500 observations per year per variable). 
On average, ethanol production declines by 3.75 billion gallon or 30 percent from the 
baseline forecast and wholesale ethanol prices fall $0.29 per gallon (17.8 percent) with the removal 
of the tax credit. The implied retail price of ethanol increases by 12.5 percent due to the decline in 
ethanol production. In this scenario much of the demand response comes from the E10 category. 
Demand in the additive category largely fills a mandated inclusion. E85 responds less in this 
scenario because ethanol prices rarely fall low enough to make it competitive. Relative 
responsiveness is sensitive to the starting point for prices and the direction of change. Other 
scenarios, including one which would reduce ethanol prices, would likely result in the biggest 
response in E85 demand as the ethanol to gasoline price ratio pushes demand to the more 
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responsive part of the demand curve. Ethanol imports increase an average of 160 million gallons 
(49.4 percent) compared to baseline levels. While one might expect a larger increase in imports 
with the removal of the export tariff (Elobeid and Tokgoz), the magnitude is limited by the decline 
in domestic wholesale ethanol prices. Ethanol dry mill net returns to fixed investment drop to 
$0.04 cents per gallon down $0.15 from the baseline average. This net return stops investment in 
ethanol plants since the average fixed costs of investment is approximately $0.24 cents per gallon 
(Elobeid, Tokgoz, Hayes, Babcock, and Hart). Certainly there is some variation in average fixed 
and variable costs across ethanol plants. If all plants were identical and returns over operating costs 
remained positive, then plants should operate at normal capacity. Within the stochastic results 
some outcomes produced ethanol returns which were actually negative suggesting that while many 
plants may not be making a profit, other plants continued to cover operating costs. 
Corn prices decline by $0.30 per bushel due to the reduction in ethanol processor demand. 
With lower corn prices and less competition from distillers grains, corn feed demand increases by 
6.8 percent (400 million bushels) while export demand increases by 16.9 percent (400 million 
bushels also). Corn exports are more price elastic than corn feed demand which results in a larger 
proportional increase in exports. Corn planted acreage falls by 3.38 million acres to 86.5 million 
acres driving down corn production by 520 million bushels as corn prices weaken relative to other 
crops. Wheat and soybean acreage increases by 0.54 and 1.10 million acres, respectively. Relative 
to the FAPRI baseline, CRP acres also increase by 0.65 million acres while 1.11 million marginal 
acres do not remain in production. 
Biodiesel prices fall an average of $0.95 per gallon with the elimination of the $1.00 per 
gallon tax credit. The biodiesel industry is more heavily dependent on the tax credit because of 
tighter profit margins than the ethanol industry biodiesel production falls 53.9 percent or 270 
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million gallons from the baseline. With vegetable oil prices very sensitive to additional demand, 
average biodiesel returns were marginal even with an extension the tax credit in the baseline.  
Without the tax credit, biodiesel returns and production decline sharply. 
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Table 1.  Biofuel Tax and Tariff Expiration: 2011-2016 Averages
Tax Provisions Tax Provisions
Extended Expire as Absolute Percentage
Indefinitely Scheduled Difference Difference
Tax and Tariff Provisions (Dollars per Gallon)
   Ethanol Tax Credit 0.51 0.00 -0.51 -100.0%
   Biodiesel Tax Credit (Virgin Oil) 1.00 0.00 -1.00 -100.0%
   Ethanol Specific Tariff 0.54 0.00 -0.54 -100.0%
Biofuel Sector Results (Billion Gallons)
   Ethanol Production 12.37 8.61 -3.75 -30.4%
   Ethanol Net Imports 0.32 0.48 0.16 49.4%
   Ethanol Domestic Disappearance 12.68 9.11 -3.57 -28.1%
   Biodiesel Production 0.51 0.23 -0.27 -53.9%
(Dollars per Gallon)
   Ethanol Price, FOB Omaha Plant 1.63 1.34 -0.29 -17.8%
   Ethanol Implied Retail Price 1.76 1.98 0.22 12.5%
   Dry Mill Returns Over Operating Costs 0.19 0.04 -0.15 -79.7%
   Biodiesel Plant Price 3.07 2.12 -0.95 -31.0%
Corn Sector Supply and Use (Billion Bushels)
   Corn Production 13.83 13.31 -0.52 -3.7%
   Corn Ethanol Use 4.14 2.82 -1.33 -32.1%
   Corn Feed Use 5.84 6.24 0.40 6.8%
   Corn Exports 2.37 2.77 0.40 16.9%
Soybean Sector Supply and Use (Billion Bushels)
   Soybean Production 3.05 3.10 0.05 1.6%
   Soybean Crush 1.92 1.92 0.01 0.3%
   Soybean Exports 0.95 0.99 0.03 3.4%
(Billion Pounds)
   Soyoil Biodiesel Use 2.95 1.33 -1.62 -55.0%
   Soyoil Other Domestic Use 17.11 17.73 0.62 3.6%
   Soyoil Exports 1.85 2.91 1.07 57.9%
Crop Planted Acreage (Million Acres)
   Corn 89.84 86.46 -3.38 -3.8%
   Soybeans 70.08 71.18 1.10 1.6%
   Wheat 57.46 58.00 0.54 0.9%
   9 Other Crops Plus Hay 96.42 96.40 -0.03 0.0%
   Conservation Reserve Area 31.95 32.60 0.65 2.0%
   12 Crops + Hay + CRP 345.76 344.64 -1.11 -0.3%
Crop Sector Prices (Dollars per Bushel)
   Corn Farm Price 3.11 2.81 -0.30 -9.6%
   Soybean Farm Price 6.63 6.14 -0.49 -7.4%
   Wheat Farm Price 4.19 4.03 -0.16 -3.9%
   Sorghum Farm Price 3.01 2.81 -0.20 -6.6%
(Cents per Pound)
   Upland Cotton Farm Price 58.10 57.85 -0.26 -0.4%
   Soyoil Market Price, Decatur 34.34 26.89 -7.45 -21.7%
(Dollars per Ton)
   Soymeal Price, 48% Protein 166.09 179.85 13.75 8.3%
   Distillers' Grain Price, Indiana 102.39 113.35 10.96 10.7%
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Table 1.  Biofuel Tax and Tariff Expiration: 2011-2016 Averages, cont.
Tax Provisions Tax Provisions
Extended Expire as Absolute Percentage
Indefinitely Scheduled Difference Difference
Tax and Tariff Provisions (Dollars per Gallon)
   Ethanol Tax Credit 0.51 0.00 -0.51 -100.0%
   Biodiesel Tax Credit (Virgin Oil) 1.00 0.00 -1.00 -100.0%
   Ethanol Specific Tariff 0.54 0.00 -0.54 -100.0%
Meat and Milk Production (Billion Pounds)
   Beef Production 28.39 28.44 0.05 0.2%
   Pork Production 22.56 22.65 0.09 0.4%
   Broiler Production 39.73 39.87 0.14 0.3%
   Milk Production 199.66 199.93 0.27 0.1%
Livestock and Dairy Prices (Dollars per Hundredweight)
   Steers, Nebraska Direct 84.61 84.13 -0.48 -0.6%
   Feeder Steers, Oklahoma City 100.55 101.11 0.55 0.5%
   Barrows & Gilts, 51-52% Lean 49.75 48.97 -0.78 -1.6%
   Broilers, 12-City Wholesale 70.82 70.08 -0.74 -1.0%
   All Milk 14.47 14.41 -0.06 -0.4%
Government Outlays (Billion Dollars)
   Marketing Loans (Crop Years) 0.59 0.93 0.34 56.9%
   Countercyclical Payments (Crop Years) 0.90 1.13 0.23 25.2%
   Net CCC Oultays (Fiscal Years) 11.17 11.74 0.57 5.1%
   Ethanol Tax Credit 6.47 0.00 -6.47 -100.0%
Farm Income (Billion Dollars)
   Crop Receipts 154.06 147.34 -6.72 -4.4%
   Livestock Receipts 134.16 133.54 -0.61 -0.5%
   Government Payments 11.06 11.63 0.57 5.1%
   Rent to Non-Operator Landlords 14.13 12.44 -1.69 -12.0%
   Other Production Expenses 270.78 268.54 -2.24 -0.8%
   Total Production Expenses 284.92 280.98 -3.93 -1.4%
   Other Net Farm Income 46.64 46.38 -0.27 -0.6%
   Net Farm Income 61.00 57.91 -3.09 -5.1%
(Dollars per Acre)
Value of Farm Real Estate 2,746 2,670 -75.23 -2.7%
(Index)
Consumer Food Price Index 228.6 228.4 -0.2 -0.1%
   
 17
Soybean prices fall an average of $0.49 per bushel with an expansion in soybean area due to less 
competition from corn and a 21.7 percent decline in soybean oil prices. Meal prices increase by 8.3 
percent with less competition from distiller’s dried grains and stronger demand from the livestock 
sector. 
Lower feed prices stimulate livestock production with beef, pork, and broiler production up 
0.2 percent, 0.4 percent, and 0.3 percent, respectively. Fed livestock prices are marginally weaker 
with more production, but feeder steer prices are 0.5 percent higher. Lower feed costs would, all 
else equal, increase profits feedlots resulting in higher input prices (feed steer prices) and lower 
output prices (steer prices) when markets adjust. 
 The scenario indicates that annual government costs decrease by an average of $6.5 billion 
if fuel taxes credits on ethanol and biodiesel are permitted to expire, while expenditures on farm 
programs expand by $0.57 billion. The elimination of the tariff also has a small effect on 
government outlays for farm programs, reducing marketing loan payments and countercyclical 
payments by a marketing year annual average of $0.34 billion and $0.23 billion, respectively. Farm 
income falls by $3.1 billion per year on average despite a reduction in expenses of $3.9 billion per 
year. Interestingly, both crop and livestock receipts decline as additional livestock production is 
more than offset by lower livestock prices. Average land values are $75 per acre lower under the 
scenario, falling to an average of $2,670 per acre compared with $2,746 per acre in the baseline. 
Land rents are also lower with a decline in rent to non-operator landlords of $1.7 billion. 
Consumer prices are marginally lower with a 0.1 percent decline in the consumer price index for 
food under the scenario. 
Stochastic analysis provides additional insight into the potential variability around the 
results. Figures 1 and 2 present the baseline and scenario stochastic results for ethanol production 
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versus crude oil price. Clearly allowing the biofuels credit and import tariff to expire has significant 
implications for the growth in ethanol production even in the event that oil prices are substantially 
higher than current levels. For example, at $80 per barrel crude oil, the baseline results include 
several possible ethanol production points above 20 billion gallons. However, under the scenario of 
no further support, at $80 per barrel crude oil, the highest ethanol production point is 15 billion 
gallons. It is also interesting to notice how under low crude oil prices (less than $45 per barrel), the 
scenario tends to trace out ethanol production levels at or slightly below the mandated 
consumption levels in the 2005 Energy Act. In fact, the weaker oil prices become, the more ethanol 
imports begin to replace US ethanol production because of the lower cost of producing ethanol 
from sugarcane in Brazil. 
 
Figure 1. Crude Oil Prices and Ethanol Production
        Stochastic Baseline Results for 2016
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Figure 2. Crude Oil Prices and Ethanol Production
        Stochastic Scenario Results for 2016
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The situation for biodiesel is more complex because vegetable oil represents 82 percent of 
the variable cost of production biodiesel where as corn accounts for 65 percent of the cost of 
ethanol production. Removal of the biodiesel tax credit for virgin oils quickly pushes biodiesel 
operating margins substantially into the red, dropping biodiesel production. In Figure 3, the 
baseline results suggest that soydiesel production has no relationship with crude oil price. 
However, this outcome is not because higher crude oil prices do not increase biodiesel prices, but 
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because soybean oil prices increase more rapidly from a variety of interrelated factors. Among these 
factors are the spillover impacts from ethanol on biodiesel. In the baseline ethanol production 
increases corn prices and reduces soybean acreage planted increasing soybean prices relative to the 
no tax credit extension scenario. In addition, in the baseline, soybean meal prices are pressured 
lower through greater production of DDGs reducing the incentive to crush soybeans which pushes 
up soybean oil prices. Therefore, the net effect of higher petroleum prices is a disproportionate 
increase in soybean oil prices, which actually dominates the positive effect of higher petroleum 
prices on biodiesel prices (Figure 5). In Figure 4, crude oil prices seem to have a larger impact, but 
this is because soybean oil prices tend to be lower under the scenario due to less biodiesel 
production and less spillover impacts from ethanol. In Figure 6, the scenario results suggest that 
soydiesel production has no relationship with soybean oil prices, but this is because soybean oil 
prices are low compared with the baseline, making the biodiesel profit margin more sensitive to 
changes in crude oil prices. 
Figure 3. Crude Oil Prices and Soydiesel Production
      Stochastic Baseline Results for 2016
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Figure 4. Crude Oil Prices and Soydiesel Production
      Stochastic Scenario Results for 2016
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Figure 5. Soybean Oil Prices and Soydiesel Production
 Stochastic Baseline Results for 2016
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Figure 6. Soybean Oil Prices and Soydiesel Production
 Stochastic Scenario Results for 2016
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Conclusions 
The analysis presented above shows the degree to which biofuel industries in the US are dependent 
on public financial support. In the event that the biofuel tax credits and ethanol import tariff are 
permitted to expire, the ethanol production would contract by 30 percent and biodiesel production 
by more than half. These results even take into account the recent surge in capacity, but net 
returns would fall so dramatically that many of these plants would be unused for their inability even 
to cover operating costs.  
 An improvement this study offers relative to preceding analysis is the inclusion of ethanol 
imports and the relevant import tariff. Whereas previous studies have implicitly assumed a series of 
uninterrupted links connecting corn and oil prices, passing through the ethanol market without 
fail, the model described above explicitly represents the market-clearing identity of the ethanol and 
corn markets, permitting trade to affect each. In particular, the implications of changes in ethanol 
policy – certainly the ethanol import tariff – or conditioning factors such as the oil price on the 
corn market depend appropriately on the responsiveness of ethanol imports. In the event of 
concurrent elimination of the tax credit that subsidizes ethanol use and the tariff that limits 
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production, effects partly counteract each other but nevertheless lead to an increase of the likely 
very low level of imports by half. 
 The effect of less government subsidy to biofuel is lower government costs. The expiration 
of the tax credit saves taxpayers $6.5 billion on average. The ethanol tariff expiration reduces 
government revenue, but the quantities imported at this rate are likely to be low so little revenue is 
lost. On the other hand, agricultural policies that pay more when prices fall are activated, raising 
government costs by more than $0.57 billion on average. The net effect is $5.9 billion less 
government expenditure. 
 Reducing a subsidy and tariff that support production of goods made from crop inputs 
lowers farm income. Corn producers lose a substantial amount of income as the second largest 
category of demand decreases, but the effects of dramatically lower biodiesel and cross-crop 
substitution distributes losses among all crop producers. Livestock producers pay lower feed costs, 
but their inclination to raise output in response leads to falling output prices as quantities move 
along an inelastic demand. Moreover, considering overall net farm income, the savings of livestock 
producers on feed costs is enabled by the lower output prices crop producers receive. The 
aggregate loss, on average, is $3 billion. 
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